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Macedonian municipalities should pass anti-corruption ordinances in order to reduce 
corruption. The paper reviews the legal issues involved in drafting such ordinances and 
provides legal advisors to local councils with the legal and economic analysis needed to 
tackle some of the more difficult and detailed questions. The most important issue revolves 
around the creation of a model ordinance which Macedonian municipalities (or the 
Association of Units of Local Self-Government of the Republic of Macedonia) could adopt 
in order to set-up and run municipal-level anti-corruption agencies. The location of such 
agencies as well as their competencies (to monitor conflicts of interests, oversee asset 
declarations, and conduct corruption risk-audits among others ) are analysed. The paper 
also provides legal interpretations of Macedonian legislation and their likely impact on 
municipal council ordinance design in the area of anti-corruption -- providing the legal 
basis for positive administrative silence, the splitting of municipal procurement contracts, 
and (most controversially) qui tam rewards at the municipal level. A brief regulatory 
impact analysis of the ordinance shows a gain of €162,900 in social welfare if such a 
programme were rolled-out in Macedonia.  
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Anti-Corruption Law in Local Government: Legal Issues related to Ordinance-
Design and Municipal-Level Anti-Corruption Agencies in Macedonia
1 
Bryane Michael, Linacre College (Oxford) and 
Stephen Mendes, European Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) 
Introduction 
 
For the last decade, a large number of anti-corruption programmes have focused on 
the local or city level. During this decade, Ronald Mac-Lean’s case study of La Paz’s anti-
corruption programme served as the model for anti-corruption strategies around the world 
and at every level of government.
2 Many powerful arguments point to the need to create 
local-level anti-corruption programmes – particularly in Macedonia. First, much local 
service provision – where corruption is most prevalent -- occurs at the municipal level.
3 
Second, the EU-wide decentralisation trend makes focusing on sub-national government 
more important; and Macedonia’s recent decentralisation programme provides many 
opportunities for corruption at the municipal level. Third, Macedonia represents an 
ethnically diverse nation – making municipal-level policy preferences at times very 
different than national level ones. As such, the optimal level for anti-corruption 
lawmaking in Macedonia could well be at the local instead of the national level. However, 
most local anti-corruption programmes proceed with little or no legal analysis – with local 
and international experts simply organising “stakeholder meetings” and “action plans” 
having no legal basis.
4 The present paper hopes to provide some of the legal analysis 
which these previous papers lack.  
 
Macedonian municipalities should pass anti-corruption ordinances in order to 
reduce corruption. This paper reviews the legal issues involved in the drafting of such 
ordinances – particularly in relation to the establishment and functioning of municipal-
 
1 For the purposes of this paper, we refer to the internationally recognised name of the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (and the internally recognised name of the Republic of Macedonia) simply as 
Macedonia. We use the simple name Macedonia on the grounds of simplicity. Our reference does not imply 
a political association related to the country’s name (and as technocrats, we have no personal views on the 
country’s name). As a contribution to the liberal academic tradition, the ideas in this paper reflect our views 
and opinions and do not impact or reflect any policy advice we may provide in any non-academic capacity.  
2 See Robert Klitgaard, Ronald MacLean-Abaroa and H. Lindsey Parris, A Practical Approach To Dealing 
With Municipal Malfeasance, UNDP/UNCHS/World Bank-UMP Conference Paper (1998), available 
online. The impact of these authors’ subsequent book Corrupt Cities can not be over-estimated -- as the 
“action planning” and “stakeholder involvement” concepts evoked in their work have served as the basis for 
most World Bank and USAID anti-corruption programmes targeting the sub-national (and even national!) 
level. In 2008, the UNDP-Moldova’s tender for training in local anti-corruption contractually required 
bidders to demonstrate specific knowledge of Corrupt Cities and follow the strategies contained within.  
3 See Daniel Kaufmann, Judith Montoriol-Garriga, and Francesca Recanatini, How Does Bribery Affect 
Public Service Delivery? Micro-Evidence from Service Users and Public Officials in Peru, WORLD BANK 
POL. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 4492, 2008, available online. Macedonia particularly represents a 
mystery as only 17% of public service users reported in a 2006 survey to having paid a bribe in the previous 
5 years. See SAINTS CYRIL AND METHODIUS UNIVERSITY OF SKOPJE, PUBLIC OPINION ON CORRUPTION IN 
THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, Available online.  The apparent contradiction between the high levels 
internationally of municipal-level corruption and low levels in Macedonia may be explained by the relative 
newness of Macedonia’s decentralisation programme.  
4 Municipal-level anti-corruption programmes have been heavily supported by the World Bank and USAID. 
As an example of the unholy alliance between the World Bank and USAID in the area of decentralisation 
and anti-corruption, see the USAID policy brief hosted on the World Bank website, Robert W. Rafuse, Jr., 
Why Fiscal Decentralization in Macedonia? Available online.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 3 
 
                                                
level anti-corruption agencies (as defined later in this paper).
5 The first section of this 
paper briefly covers municipal government structure in Macedonia and reviews the anti-
corruption legislative provisions which cover Macedonian municipal officials. The second 
section discusses legal issues related to the main causes of municipal corruption: 
monopoly power, regulatory discretion and lack of accountability. The third section argues 
for the creation of three municipal-level anti-corruption agencies (as defined in this paper), 
provides the legal basis for their creation, and discusses the optimal “location” of these 
agencies. The fourth section provides the legal basis for ordinance-based qui tam rewards 
given at the municipal-level – rewards which these agencies can recommend in order to 
facilitate their own work. The fifth section provides the outlines of a model ordinance 
which Macedonian municipalities individually (or collectively through a forum such as the 
Association of Units of Local Self-Government or ZELS) could adopt in order to establish 
and provide the legal competencies to these municipal-level anti-corruption agencies. The 
final section providing concluding thoughts and unanswered questions for further research.  
Municipal Government in Macedonia and Legislative Anti-Corruption Provisions 
Covering Municipal Bodies 
 
At present, Macedonia has 84 municipal governments of varying sizes – with 
Skopje (the administrative capitol) being both the richest and most populous city.
6 Figure 
1 shows data about these municipal governments grouped into areas.
7 As shown in Figure 
1, the average citizen of Skopje earns about $12,000 whereas the citizen in the Northeast 
region will earn about $4,000 per year. Unsurprisingly, the distribution of municipal 
revenues and expenditures follows the same trends as the population and GDP per capita 
figures (as shown in Figure 2) – with Skopje accounting for over 20% of the country’s 
government revenue and expenditure.
8 Data on municipal level expenditures (and 
revenues) provide some insight into municipal-level corruption risks (as presumably more 
affluent municipalities put more public money at risk through higher volumes of 
expenditure and offer greater temptations to collect bribes from the higher revenue base).
9 
As discussed later, local ordinances should take the relative degree of corruption risk into 
account.   
 
 
5 Thoughout the paper, we use the word ordinance (the US term) instead of by-law (which is usually the 
term used throughout the Commonwealth) in order to prevent confusion about the level of legal analysis 
being discussed and to prevent possible confusion in the Macedonian language version of the paper.   
6 Most Macedonian legal texts (following the Law on Local Self-Government) refer to municipalities as 
“units of local self-government.” Article 2 of the Law notes that “units of local self-government are: the 
municipalities and the City of Skopje.” Throughout this text, we refer to these units of local self-government 
as municipalities. See Law on Local Self-Government, Official Gazette No. 52/95, available online 
[hereinafter Local Government Law].  
7 Macedonian law only establishes two tiers of government (national and municipal). Janeska et al. 
presumably use the groupings of municipalities shown in Figures 1 and 2 to reduce the complexity of their 
data. VERICA JANESKA, ANICA DRAGOVIC, ILO TRAJKOVSKI, DIMITAR BOGOV AND ALEKSANDAR 
IVANOVSKI. DATA AND INDICATORS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES IN MACEDONIA (2006). available online. 
8 The close tie between municipal level revenues and expenditures signifies the lack of central transfers 
between regions.  
9 In theory, total corruption risk can be described as the probability (for each municipality) of that 
municipality’s revenue being subject to theft or under-collection due to corruption. The collection of these 
84 individual municipality estimates comprises the corruption risk for national municipal-level revenue. In 
order to arrive at the estimated value of corruption involving Macedonian municipal revenues requires 
multiplying the corruption risk for each of the municipalities by the municipalities’ yearly revenue -- and 
then summing these 84 estimates to arrive at a national estimate. For more, see Bryane Michael and Mariya 
Polner, Fighting Corruption on the Transdnistrian Border: Lessons from Failed and Successful Anti-
Corruption Programmes, TRANS. STUD. REV. (forthcoming), available online. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 4 
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The types of services which local governments provide stem from “home rule” 
provisions outlined in the national Constitution and the legislation related to local 
government. The 1992 Local Government Law defines a number of areas of service 
provision, which Figure 3summarises. To finance these services, Macedonian municipal 
governments principally collect real estate taxes.
10  
 
Figure 3: Selected Services Provided by Macedonian Municipal Government 
 
Unique jurisdiction  (article 17 of Local Government Law) 
determine and regulate building 
zones 
garbage collection  top up funding for primary 
schools 
name and maintain local roads 
and streets 
regulate and organise public 
lighting 
establish secondary schools 
supervise drinking water supply  maintain parks, green areas and 
public cemeteries 
ensure environmental protection 
tourism promotion  develop civil society networks  regulate public parking 
provide for rainwater drainage  oversee local transportation  regulate and organise street 
cleaning 
organise and regulate sewerage  maintenance and use of markets   
Shared jurisdiction (article 18 of Local Government Law) 
urban planning  provide social security and child 
care 
provide basic health care 
  sponsor sporting events  sponsor cultural events 
                                                 
10 Article 17(1) of the Local Government Law refers only to real estate taxes as a method of municipal 
finance.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 5 
 
                                                
Source: Ilija (1994) and articles 17 and 18 of the Law on Local Self-Government.
11  
Municipal governments have the same mandate for fighting corruption as all 
government entities.
12 They must uphold the national law – being the subjects of national 
legislation -- such as the Law on the Prevention of Corruption (hereinafter the Anti-
Corruption Law), the Law on the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest (hereinafter the 
Conflict of Interest Law), and other laws – as summarised in Figure 4. Like the central 
authorities, municipal government agents (as both individuals and as representatives of 
their employers as legal persons) can be defendants in criminal, civil and administrative 
prosecutions (and thus are bound by the Macedonian criminal and civil codes as well as 
the Law on Misdemeanours). Municipal authorities must also comply with the provisions 
of a number of pieces of legislation which indirectly impact on corruption through their 
effects on public accountability and public sector transparency – notably the Law on Free 
Access to Information of a Public Character (hereinafter the Freedom of Information Law) 
and the Law on Public Procurement. Municipal authorities (as legal persons) must also 
comply with the Law on Internal Audit.
13  
Particularities of Anti-Corruption Municipal Government Law 
 
Municipalities differ from central level agencies in several important respects – 
requiring additional anti-corruption measures to be put in place.
14  First, municipal 
expenditure accounts for a relatively high proportion of GDP (through public service 
provision) with the potential problems of market power which bedevil any market. 
Second, as one of the raisons d’etre of municipal government consists of tying more 
closely service provision to local needs, local officials exercise greater discretion (as given 
by regulators and/or local councils). Third, local governments, unlike central government 
ministries, are (in theory) more accountable to the electorate -- because municipal officials 
are directly elected by their neighbours and community members. Each of these three 
elements – namely the potential for monopoly power, the exercise of discretion by public 
officials, and local political accountability – impact on local corruption. As a heuristic, the 
anti-corruption literature often cites “Klitgaard’s formula” as corruption (C) equals 




11 See Ilija Todorovski, MACEDONIA, available online.  
12 For a verbose overview of the broader issues and institutional history of recent anti-corruption reforms in 
Macedonia, see NEDA KORUNOVSKA AND DANCE DANILOVSKA, MACEDONIA AND THE CORRUPTION 
SITUATION AND CHALLENGES (2004). Available online. 
13 In addition, municipalities have additional competencies for fighting corruption as defined in the 
legislation related to Macedonian decentralisation policy – particularly in the area of the “strengthening of 
oversight.” See MINISTRY OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE, PROGRAMME FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
DECENTRALISATION PROCESS. Available online. For a recent review of the issues, see OECD, Republic of 
Macedonia Decentralisation Process, available online.  
14 Many of the issues covered in this section derive from Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee, 
Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability: An Overview, in SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC CORRUPTION. The chapter is also available online.  












Defines a long, specific list of possible areas of corrupt activity, potential 
conflicts of interest and establishes the State Commission for the Prevention of 
Corruption (the State Commission). 




Outlines requirements for declaring interests and the methods the State 
Commission uses for checking those interests. 




Establishes a list of entities from which private individuals can obtain 
information, the official procedures for obtaining information and creates the 
(succinctly named) Commission for the Protection of the Right to Free Access 
to Information of a Public Character.  
Law on Civil Servants
19
  Establishes the legal definition of civil servants and individuals covered under 
related legislation. Articles 18 and 19 specifically address work discipline.  
Criminal Code
20 Revisions to the Criminal Code make bribery a criminal offence  
Law on Misdemeanours
21   Revisions to the Law on Misdemeanours allows for a broader range of 
punishments for corruption offences.  
Law on Ombudsman  Creates a toothless entity whose only function is to appeal to the public and 
parliament. 
Public Procurement Law
22 Modern law which establishes the same tender procedures used in other 
countries to reduce corruption. Requires competitive bidding for contracts over 
€500.  
Law on Internal Audit  Allows for compliance and performance audit which allows public institutions 
(including municipal governments) to discover inefficiencies that may point to 
corruption.  
Source: authors.    
 
Public procurements comprise the main area of corruption risk for municipal 
government. Local government officials are thought to exercise monopoly power over the 
provision of public services. Municipalities deal primarily in the provision of goods 
traditionally thought to be public goods – namely goods that private companies do not 
have the incentive to provide.
23 Such goods providers are frequently monopoly providers 
in their markets (and thus generating “rents” frequently referred to in the corruption 
literature). In Macedonia, according to Figure 5, these procurements totalled a bit less than 
€50 million – comprising about 25% of the value of procurements for state-owned 
                                                 
16 Law on the Prevention of Corruption (2002), available online [hereinafter Anti-Corruption Law]. The 
2002 Law (as amended in 2004) does not explicit define the groups of individuals covered by the Law 
except for Article 2 which covers “[individuals] which [use their] function, public authorization, official 
duty and position for the purpose to gain any benefit for oneself or for other person.” Rather unhelpfully, 
Article 8(1) notes that “for determining the meaning of terms, such as elected or appointed functionary, 
public official, legal entity, responsible person in [a] legal entity and [a] person exercising matters of public 
interest, the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning [the] meaning of terms shall apply.”  
17 Law on Conflict of Interests, available online.  
18 Law on Free Access to Information of a Public Character (2006), available online. 
19 Law on Civil Servants, available online.  
20 Criminal Code, available online.  
21 Law on Misdemeanor, available online.  
22 Public Procurement Law (2008), available online. 
23 The law only vague refers to the definition or regulation of public goods anywhere in the world. Public 
goods, as defined in economics, are non-rival and non-excludible. Consequently, their provision requires 
either collective or monopoly provision -- as no one individual or entity will have the economic incentive to 
provide them. Many such public goods ostensibly result in natural monopolies which, under certain 
circumstances, result in rents which government officials may seek to appropriate. Clearly, limits on market 
access also generate such rents (and remedies for such rent-seeking behaviour are partly addressed in the 
public procurement law as discussed subsequently in this paper).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 7 
 
enterprises and about half the value of the central agencies. In order to reduce monopoly 
power in Macedonia, two laws govern municipalities – the public procurement law and the 
law on the protection of competition. Yet, these two laws only provide a minimum 
framework – requiring additional ordinance-based provisions aimed at preventing 
corruption.  
 




























Source: Public Procurement Bureau (2007)
 
 
The public procurement law requires additional support from municipal ordinance-
making in order to help reduce the probability of corruption in municipal-level public 
procurement. First, the procurement commissions hold too much unaccountable power. 
According to the Law on Public Procurement, municipal governments have the right to 
establish their own procurement commissions and appoint at their own pleasure the type 
and number of commission members.
24 The Law on Public Procurement itself provides 
few safeguards against bidders “getting to” the members of the commission – a large 
corruption risk particularly given a small country where “everyone knows everyone.”
25 
Moreover, the public procurement law does not provide a mechanism of oversight over 
these commissions or the public procurement system in general. The Public Procurement 
Bureau possesses competencies more akin to a think-tank than a regulatory and 
enforcement body. Indeed, from its annual report, the number of submission of PPR-1 
Registry forms (which inform the Public Procurement Bureau about a procurement 
conducted by a state agency) appears to depend on mostly on voluntary compliance by 
state agencies to submit these forms.
26 The Public Procurement Bureau further notes that 
negotiated procedure tenders (requiring no public announcement of the tender) increased 
by 50% from 2006 to 2007.
27 
  
                                                 
24 Specifically, Article 28(2) of the Public Procurement Law notes that “the decision [to award a public 
tender] shall [describe] the subject (type) and quantities required, the amount and source of funds required to 
execute the contract, the manner and the procedure for awarding the public contract and appoint the 
chairman and members of the procurement commission (hereinafter: the commission), their number and 
deputies, as well as possible external experts to be hired, if necessary” [italics mine, changes made to the 
original text to improve clarity of the English language translation].  
25 Moreover, the punishments apportioned by the Macedonian legislation are extremely weak. The Conflict 
of Interest Law only provides for the dismissal of the public procurement commission member who has been 
found colluding with a bidder while – if the person could be charged with corruption – would receive a fine 
of between €333 and €833.   
26 Public Procurement Bureau, Report on the Public Procurement Bureau’s Activities on the Implementation 
of the Public Procurement System in 2007 (2008), available online. 
27 Id., at 19.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 8 
 
The second issue related to public procurement involves the nexus between 
municipal-level regulation and the provision of public services by state owned enterprises. 
According to Figure 5, the highest value of government contracts derived from public 
enterprises (whose internal over-sight is less than ideal).
28 Moreover, chapter IX of the 
Public Procurement Law defines the procedures for public utilities (of which, many are 
covered by municipal-level providers) – namely water, energy, transport, postal services 
and other utilities. Yet, the chapter provides almost as many exceptions and exemptions to 
the Public Procurement as it imposes positive obligations.  
 
Figure 6: Exclusions under Public Procurement Law 
 
area of exclusion  exclusions 
general  when less than €500 (art. 11), utilities contract part of bigger contract, 
then can be “lumped in” (art. 178). 
water  exempt if water production needed for non drinking purposes (art. 
181), the production of water is for operator’s own use.   
gas, heat, electricity  gas production occurs incidentally or as intermediary for other 
production (art. 183). Electricity also exempt based on own-use (art. 
184). 
bus   exempt if other bus providers are already present (art. 186),  
infrastructure  airports, ports and terminals exempted (art. 188).  
     Source: Law on Public Procurement (2008).  
 
Finally, the present Law on Public Procurement makes self-enforcement (through 
appeals from losing bidders) rather difficult. The Law provides extremely detailed 
provisions for the operation of a State Appeals Commission with the mandate to hear 
allegations of procurement related improprieties (arts. 200-229). However, the Law makes 
little provision for the public release of winning bidder information and no provision for 
independent audit or oversight of the procurement system. Indeed, under the current 
system, any bidder or third-party alleging any infraction of the Procurement Law should 
have enough evidence to convince the State Appeals Commission beyond a reasonable 
doubt – or face the payment of all court fees and top-up fines of up to €300 (arts 228-229). 
Such procedures are likely to have a chilling effect on individuals with suspicions of 
improprieties which could serve as useful intelligence in the investigation of procurement-
related corruption offences.   
 
The issue of anti-competitive behaviour between municipal-level service providers 
represents one of the most challenging aspects of municipal anti-corruption reform in 
Macedonia -- particularly given the country’s small size. Municipal markets for water, 
electricity, lighting, parking and other municipal-level services face (or may face with 
additional private sector development) a number of issues related to collusion between 
service providers and members of procurement committees -- as well as face issues related 
to corrupt collusion among service providers themselves.
29 Suppose, hypothetically, that 
parking services providers in Tetovo had colluded to either “farm rents” (namely use their 
government contract to collect payments – part of which they returned to one or more 
                                                 
28 For the problems related to audit and oversight of Macedonian public enterprises (and all state bodies), see 
World Bank, Macedonia - Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2004), available online.  
29 Naturally, the Law on the Protection of Competition establishes that “agreements concluded between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practice which have the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition as their objective or effect shall be prohibited” (as per article 7) 
except for block agreements (as defined in article 8 and contracts of minor importance as defined in article 
9).  
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 9 
 
members of the procurement commission). Such rents could also be used to pay off traffic 
police or regulations who oversee these parking service providers.  
 
Municipal-level anti-corruption ordinance-making can address the issue of corrupt 
collusion in a number of ways. Figure 7a illustrates one possible solution to the simple 
hypothetical example (given previously) of collusion in parking service provision in 
Tetovo. The ordinance could encourage the procurement commission to split the contract 
– such that individuals parking their cars could choose where to park based on parking 
service provision by different parking lot operators. Alternatively, the contract could 
award parking service providers with the right to offer services anywhere in the 
municipality – encouraging competition among the two service providers. While the 
design of such a procurement seems counter-intuitive (and inefficient at first glance due to 
the additional complexity and cost of dealing with two service providers who perform the 
same service), the result would be to decrease the likelihood of collusion among parking 
service providers as well as between parking service providers and the procurement 










Figure 7a: Issues in Municipal-Level Collusion Leading to Corruption: 







Two ways of addressing intra-municipal corruption
1. split up service providers and let service users “vote with their feet”
2. allow service providers non-exclusivity 
Results in counter-intuitive result as increases “harmful” competition, 
decreases economies of scale and increases number of service providers
Warning: Bidders shouldn’t be allowed to decide on split
 
 
  Corrupt collusion in municipal-level service provision may also result from the 
innocent repeated interaction with the same service provider – resulting in the forbearance 
of other service providers from entering the local market. Even if the chosen service 
provider represents the best value for money, the ensuing lack of an alternative provider 
may result in incentives for corruption (as shown in Figure 7b). Again, as the Law on 
Public Procurement remains silent on handling such cases, ordinance-based remedies may 
include encouraging – possibly contrary to the provisions of article 9 of the Public 
Procurement Law -- the procurement committee to split up contracts and encourage them 
to seek bidders from more distant locations.
30   
 
                                                 
30 Article 9 of the Public Procurement Law states “(1) Public procurement may not be divided into portions 
nor its estimated value may be reduced for the purposes of avoiding certain procedure determined by this 
law, and (2) Detailed rules on the estimated value of the procurement shall be stipulated by the Minister of 
Finance.” Article 9 does not completely prohibit the splitting of contracts, only such splitting “for the 
purposes of avoiding certain procedure determined by this law.” Clearly, the purpose of reducing municipal-
level corruption does not seek to frustrate the intention of the Public Procurement Law – and thus can be 










Figure 7b: Issues in Municipal-Level Collusion Leading to Corruption: 








Repeated award of service delivery contract leads to elimination of competition
1. municipal service users have less or no freedom to choose
2. creates monopolistic market for service (and associated rents)
Results in counter-intuitive result to maintain second or third efficient service
provider (even if market saturated). Weigh inefficiency costs against expected
reduction in corruption. 
Warning: Keeping “spare” service provider should be discretionary so as not to 
provide adverse incentives due to municipality commitments. 
 
 
Corrupt collusion in the form of shrill-bidding also poses a serious problem which 
anti-corruption ordinance drafting could usefully target. The example in Figure 7c shows 
the case where corruption parking services company in Tetovo (bidding on a contract 
bringing in €200,000 in revenue) makes a corrupt transfer to another bidder in order to 
induce that bidder to submit a less appealing offer -- in exchange for €20,000. Again, 
encouraging the procurement commission to split the contract would reduce the incentives 
for the shrill (or collusive) bidder to seek and/or accept the corrupt side-payment. Fraud 
audits of both companies (or even the significant likelihood of such an audit) would also 
very likely reduce the incentives to engage in such side-payments. Local ordinances could 












Figure 7c: Issues in Municipal-Level Collusion Leading to Corruption: 











Two ways of addressing shrill bidding in intra-municipality tenders
1. allow municipality to choose more than one bidder and break up contract 
2. unexplained wealth audits 
Note: If full performance on contract, not necessarily worrying...
 
 
                                                 
31 See concur with Professor Williams who finds that suppliers convicted of corruption can not be excluded 
from future tenders (though they can of course be convicted of illegal commercial behaviour). See Sope 
Williams, The Use of Exclusions for Corruption in Developing Country Procurement: The Case of South 
Africa, J. AFRICAN L. (2007).  
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Ordinance-based anti-corruption provisions may help address inter-municipal 
collusion-based corruption. Figure 7d demonstrates the case where a parking services 
provider from Kumanovo (continuing with the hypothetical case) bids on a tender in 
which the procurement commission and the parking services provider in Tetovo have 
colluded to prevent a competitive bidding process in Tetovo. In this example, an ordinance 
to encourage municipalities without a suitable second bidder to seek a tender from a 
provider in another municipality may help to reduce the close corrupt relationship between 
the commission and the Tetovo-based service provider. The Kumanovo parking services 
provider may also have increased incentives to appeal a lost tender due to less fear about 




















Figure 7d: Hypothetical Municipal-Level Collusion Leading to Corruption:
Requirements to Seek External Bids in Mechanism Design
Tetovo Kumanovo
Local bidders may be eliminated for a number of reasons:
1. Service provider repeated bid awards result in learning, relationships which
make more current supplier competitive and increase switching costs for municipality
2. Reduces potential competition
3. Natural temptation to use market power for corruption
Defence




The handling of cases of inter-municipality collusion in the procurement process 
represents another lacuna in the existing legislation which could be tackled by anti-
corruption ordinances. Figure 7e illustrates the case in which a Kumanovo-based parking 
services provider colludes with a bidder in Tetovo in order to win a Kumanovo-based 
tender. The Kumanovo-based bidder based the most qualified Tetovo-based provider to 
“throw the bid” and receives the contract. Uncovering such collusion requires inter-
municipal co-operation because the Kumanovo procurement commission’s attempt to 
engage an external service provider could be seen as aimed at improving competition in 
the municipality. The other Tetovo firms would also have little or no incentive to 
denounce the corrupt service provider (indeed they could seek such future side payments 
themselves as well as benefit by the distraction of a rival). Alternatively, Kumanovo 
firm(s) could menace external service providers with physical or other harm if they enter 
“their” market.  




















Figure 7e: Issues in Municipal-Level Collusion Leading to Corruption: 
Inter-municipal collusion, side-payments and barriers to entry 
Tetovo Kumanovo
Kumanovo procurement commission does duty to seek outside bids
1. Kumanovo based provider gives side payment for Tetovo company
to participate and “throw” the bid
2. Such a “side payment” could be negative (menace against participation)
3. Other Kumanovo firms free-ride from reduced competition from Tetovo
Not much can be done in this situation
1. Tetovo commissions don’t have incentive to care 
2. Tetovo competitors could seek (and thrive) such side payments instead




  In the cases of inter-municipal corruption (as shown in Figure 7f), the most 
effective legal (and administrative) remedy for corrupt collusion between bidders consists 
of ordinance-based co-ordination – instead of legislative-based solutions -- for two 
reasons. First, each municipality “pair” will have their own issues (area of public sector 
service more susceptible to corruption, monitoring mechanisms and so forth). Legislation 
can not provide the level of detail required of each municipality pair (or cluster). Second, 
municipal councils, rather than the Sobranie, are more likely to know which remedies 





















Figure 7f: Hypothetical Municipal-Level Collusion Leading to Corruption
Defences Against Inter-Municipality Collusion 
Tetovo Kumanovo
Inter-municipal co-ordination may encourage:
1. competitive bidding across municipalities
2. detection and discouragement of collusion between bidders
3. facilitated procedures for procurement (such as piggy-backing) 
Obvious risk: Commission members may engage in corruption which
expands the scope and value of such corruption  
 
 
In order to guide procurement commissions, a municipal ordinance may define a 
three-part balancing test to determine when considerations about corruption risks should 
factor into a procurement commission’s award of a tender. Clearly, a municipality should 
favour inter-municipal contracting in cases where the use of the more distant service 
provider reduces the likelihood of corruption in the municipality. However, in cases where 
a procurement commission member may seek alternative bidders, the person should 
ensure that he or she does run afoul of a perceived or actual conflict of interest. Finally, 
the procurement commission members, in deciding which bids to seek, should determine 
                                                 
32 For an excellent overview of options for municipal co-operation in procurement, see N. Kovarik, Bang for 
Your Buck-An Analysis of How Efficient Public Procurement Laws Benefit Counties, Bidders, and 
Taxpayers, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 575 (2003).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 13 
 
whether the gain from cheaper goods outweighs imputed liability if municipality found 
corrupt? Each of these considerations are summarised in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Balancing Test for Municipal Intervention in Procurement Based on 
Corruption Concerns 
 
1. Is the extra expense from using a more distant or more expensive goods/service 
provider outweighed by the potential loss from corruption?  
 
2. Does the procurement lead to risk of prosecution under the Conflict of Interest Law? 
 
3. Does the gain from cheaper or better goods and services outweigh the potential imputed 
liability to the municipality if the service provider is corrupt? 
 
 
Municipal officials exercise discretion – possessing both the create local-level 
ordinances (at the political level) and exercise professional judgement in their work (at the 
executive/administrative level). Given the regulatory (and risk averse) nature of the state, 
municipal service regulations may proliferate – leading to economic incentives to pay 
bribes in order to avoid these voluminous regulations. Macedonia has adopted a 
comprehensive law on administrative fees which greatly reduces the ability to collect 
discretionary fees.
33 Many countries use three other legal devices to help reduce the 
proliferation of red tape which helps generate corrupt rents (and thus rent-seeking 
behaviour): a Dillon-style Rule, a paperwork reduction act and/or regulatory oversight, 
and regulatory impact analysis.
34 In Macedonia, ordinances with rent-seeking provisions 
can be quashed with difficulty, as no American-style oversight structure is in place to 
oversee ordinances. Relief from such ordinances relies upon certiorari motions by the 
State Commission. Against Corruption (hereinafter the State Commission) and appeals to 
administrative courts.   
 
Individuals and organisations wishing to quash ordinances which provide 
incentives for municipal-level corruption may rely on two legislative articles. Article 57 of 
the Local Government Law allows the Constitutional Court to review ordinances for their 
“constitutionality and legality.” While no constitutional issues may be present in 
ordinances which provide discretion or lead to corruption, the “legality” part of the article 
may invoke both the Anti-Corruption Law and the executive decision of the 11
 November 
2006 to implement Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). In practice, the judicial 
interpretation of “legality,” will rely on Article 49 of the Law on the Prevention of 
Corruption which allows the State Commission to “give[] opinion[s] of proposed laws 
important for corruption prevention.” Clearly, according to its 2007 Annual Report, the 
State Commission has assumed such an oversight function over 19 laws in 2007.
35 The 
Commission’s work on regulations and particularly ordinances at the municipal level are 
unknown – particularly as municipalities are constitutionally guaranteed autonomy from 
                                                 
33 Law on Administrative Fees. Available online.  
34 Each of these issues could form an entire treatise and thus we avoid describing and analysing them to save 
space for the legal analysis on Macedonian law which follows. The Dillon Rule refers to the US doctrine that 
cities have no inherent power except those which states devolve to them. The US passed in 1985 the 
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501) which provides for the review of paperwork related 
requirements imposed on government service users. A number of offices in the US also ensure regulatory 
oversight over legislation (Office of the Management of the Budget) and various legislative affairs offices 
(which provide legal opinions on regulations and local level ordinances).  
35 State Commission for Prevention of Corruption, infra note 49 at 14.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 14 
 
national authorities.
36 Figure 9 provides a two part test for quashing rent-seeking 
ordinance provisions. 
 
Figure 9: Two part test for certiorari or injunctive relief from rent-seeking 
ordinances 
 
1. Does the ordinance provision pass (separately or as part of the overall ordinance) the 
Regulatory Impact Assessment? 
 
2. Does State Commission review of the ordinance provision under its Article 49 (of the 
Anti-Corruption Law) lead to Commission to recommend striking or amending the 
provision?   
 
   Macedonia’s positive administrative silence legal provisions also may help reduce 
municipal corruption – but require additional clarification by municipal ordinance. 
Government Decree of the 28
th November 2006 establishes the legal basis for positive 
administrative silence in Macedonia (calling it the silence-is-consent provision). Relying 
on this Decree, economic operators receive the automatic right to engage in a regulated or 
restricted activity if the relevant public official does not respond to the petitioner’s request 
for permission within a certain time.
37 As government decree, rather than legislative fiat, 
has established positive administrative silence in Macedonia, an interesting legal question 
revolves around whether municipalities may bestow such a right upon municipal-level 
service users.  
 
Municipal authority to extend the rights given by positive administrative silence to 
municipal service users relies on three conditions. First, and most obvious, the 
municipality (rather than a national entity) must possess the right or amenity – or be 
competent to issue an exception from an obligation -- which may be transferred by 
positive administrative silence. For example, the right to make a large hydro-electric plant 
on the Vardar River in the centre of Skopje may represent a right which the municipality 
does not have the right to give. Second, subsequent liability for the action must pass from 
the operator or person undertaking the action to the municipality. For example, if a large 
construction company builds a large shopping mall in the centre of Skopje (relying upon 
the municipal government’s failure to respond to a building request), and a court 
subsequently finds the mall in violation of land development laws, the municipality should 
bear liability for damages to the company. Clearly, if the land developer must pay for the 
mall’s removal, then no right had been transferred to the developer in the first place. 
Third, as positive administrative silence entails regulatory risk (some requests which 
should have been refused are allowed to proceed), positive administrative silence can only 
cover activities involving little social risk. Clearly, the right to store open-pit nuclear waste 
site confers a large social harm with only a marginal social gain. Figure 10 provides a 
three-part test for bestowing positive administrative silence rights in a municipal 
ordinance.
38   
                                                 
36 Because (as will be shown later), the State Commission avails itself of few human and financial resources 
(and thus exercises a passive oversight role), the State Commission’s effectiveness depends on whether 
victims of rent-seeking ordinance provisions make complaints. Such a factor militates heavily for the 
establishment of municipal-level anti-corruption agencies (as discussed later in this article).  
37 Decrees and other legal documents are difficult to obtain, particularly in English translation. For a 
reference to the Decree, see Cabinet of Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Streamlining existing 
regulations and Strengthening Legislative Processes, available online.  
38 At first glance, the legal expert may be tempted to tie the rights conferred by positive administrative 
silence to the municipality’s ability to respond to requests. Such a design, however, frustrates the intent of QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 15 
 
 
Figure 10: Three part test for bestowing municipal-level rights under positive 
administrative silence 
 
1. Does the municipality have the legislatively defined right to bestow (or to restrict)? 
 
2. Does the transfer of the right under positive administrative silence impute subsequent 
liability to the municipal government? 
 




An ordinance-based approach to clarifying positive administrative silence 
(particularly as a way to fighting corruption) seems less efficient than a legislative-based 
approach. An ordinance-based approach would ostensibly lead to different positive 
administrative silence rules for each of Macedonia’s 84 municipalities. Different rules in 
different municipalities would probably increase the cost of uncertainty in inter-municipal 
business transactions. Yet, the Sobranie clearly does not have a view on the national 
treatment of positive administrative silence. Thus, while increasing the cost of business, 
regulatory competition (in this case competition between ordinances) could also produce 
socially-desirable learning; partially as particular municipalities find themselves giving 
rights under positive administrative silence in order to harmonise with other municipalities 
(resulting in the famous gains from policy diffusion). Should very diverging approaches to 
positive administrative silence remain enshrined in various ordinances across Macedonia, 
the confusion and conflict arising from the patchwork of ordinances would encourage 
(liberal and pro-active) legislation – as the parliament becomes obliged to pass legislation 
related to positive administrative silence. Ordinances are also more easily repealed than 
national legislation -- making municipal councils the preferred fora for deciding questions 
related to little understood policies (such as positive administrative silence).  
 
Municipal-level service providers are often viewed as more accountable than their 
national-level line-ministry service provider peers.
39 Local level politicians manage 
municipal services (with their authority derived from the electorate and delegated to 
professional managers of the public services under their charge). Objective municipal 
service performance indicators help both local politicians and managers manage public 
services – and particularly surveys which (as the handbook of municipal councillors and 
mayors notes), “may very much improve the position of municipal representatives, since 
most of their decisions should be approved and supported by the majority of the public.”
40 
The collection of data about municipal service delivery often consists of “scorecard” 
                                                                                                                                                   
the mechanism. One of the goals of positive administrative silence provisions aims to transfer liability to 
municipality authorities and to encourage them to make investments in dealing promptly with public service 
users.  
39 See Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: 
Evidence from Audit Reports, IZA DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2843 (2007) [who conduct an innovative study of 
municipal government audit reports from Brazil to show an empirical relationship between local political 
accountability (as proxied by local rules regarding mayoral re-election) and corruption (as proxied by 
resource misappropriation).  
40 Association of Local Self - Government Units (ZELS), Handbook for Mayors and Municipal Council 
Members of the Republic of Macedonia, at 124, available online, [provides a useful vade mecum for 
municipal policy in the Republic].  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 16 
 
                                                
surveys.
41 Such scorecard surveys ask municipal service users about their objective and 
subjective experiences with the local parks service, electricity provision and other 
activities within municipal jurisdiction.
42  
 
While most analysts agree that such surveys or scorecards provide a useful 
municipal-level tool in the fight against corruption, legal scholars have not contributed to 
the debate – particularly as to whether such service delivery surveys should be legally 
obligatory. First, the State Audit Law clearly establishes the legal basis of such surveys 
(and reiterates the government’s commitment to using any method which promotes the 
“economy...efficiency...[and] effectiveness] of state expenditures”.
43 Second, Macedonian 
jurisprudence in general appears to favour such activities. Besides, the provisions laid 
down in the Public Procurement Law, State Audit Law, the Law on Civil Servants and the 
various Laws governing various state bodies – such as the Customs Implementing Law – 
the Law on Public Administration requires that “administrative bodies, shall implement 
the stipulated policy of the Government and of the [Parliament]...monitoring the situations 
in the area they are established for, giving initiative for solving the issues, dealing with 
administrative affairs, performing administrative surve[ies] and other administrative 
matters.”
44 The law, thus, establishes a clear right to conduct such surveys or scorecards 
and suggests the imposition of a legal obligation. Clearly, any municipal council which 
loses money or provides sub-adequate services because the council failed to seek data 
related to service delivery problems would be found negligent (politically and even 
possibly guilty of committing a delict against its citizens). Macedonian municipalities can 
clearly be found to act (or fail to act) in the interests of its trustees (citizens) – imposing a 
legal obligation to conduct surveys if such surveys help thwart harms stemming from 
inefficient or corrupt administration.
45   
 
Because the legal obligation to conduct service delivery surveys relies on legal 
interpretation, the subsidiary question about the level at which such an obligation is (or 
should be) established remains even less clearly defined in Macedonian law. Namely, 
should service delivery surveys be legally required at the legislative, regulatory or 
ordinance level? In this respect, as most public service provision at the municipal level 
occurs through public enterprises, the Law on Public Enterprises provides little clarity 
about whether surveys may be required of these enterprises.
46 On the one hand, these 
enterprises are required to submit development plans – and thus the results of any survey 
would only have an impact on the following year’s development plans (if at all). On the 
other hand, the municipality issues the licence for the public enterprise and can easily 
enough insist on the conduct service delivery surveys as part of the enterprise’s licensing 
 
41 See G. Thampi & S Sekhar, Citizen Report Cards, in CHARLES J. G. SAMPFORD, ARTHUR SHACKLOCK, 
CARMEL CONNORS, FREDRIK GALTUNG, MEASURING CORRUPTION (2006). 
42 Municipalities, like all public sector entities, have been involved in e-government initiatives aimed at 
providing the public information as a way of fighting corruption. See the Skopje Accountability Through 
Transparency Initiative online.  
43 State Audit Law, article 3.  
44 Law on Public Administration, at art. 69. 
45 While affording Macedonian companies some protection from liability in cases of public service failures 
(and helping to prevent such failures before they occur, the legal imposition of a requirement to conduct 
service delivery surveys acts as tax on Macedonian enterprise. In public economics theory, a n% increase in 
the cost of business results in a n-squared distortion to the economy. As such, market-distorting requirements 
(such as the legal obligation to conduct surveys) should be used sparingly.  
46 The activities outlined in article 2 of the Law on Public Enterprises which correspond with the article 17 
activities defined in the Local Government Law include activities related to the energy sector, public 
transport, telecommunications, utilisation of forests, waters, pastures and other types of natural resources, 
physical planning, public utilities, veterinary and sports. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 17 
 
                                                
requirements.
47 Figure 11 summarises the issues involved in legislative-based service 
delivery survey mandates, as well as alternative mandates which may favour ordinance-
based approaches.  
 
  The range of anti-corruption issues which municipalities must grapple with 
suggests the need for municipal-level anti-corruption agencies. As the issues suggest, the 
municipal councils can not tackle the wide range of issues related to the oversight of 
public procurement, the review of ordinance provisions, and the conduct of service 
delivery surveys alone. Nor can they rely on national level institutions such as the State 
Commission, given the lack of resources and man-power. An organisational structure 
should be put in place which involves the participation of municipalities, while engaging 
the national institutions competent to fight corruption in Macedonia.  
 
47 Article 43 of the Law on Public Enterprises requires any public enterprise to obtain a licence (following 




Figure 11: Should Service Delivery Surveys be Covered by Anti-Corruption 
Ordinance-Making? 
 
Service Delivery Surveys in Macedonia are little conducted for both central services and 
municipal services. The following represents four views about the imposition of legislative 
obligations with regard to the conduct of surveys.  
 
Laissez-fair approach – Such an approach argues for the voluntary nature of the conduct of 
such surveys. Both municipalities and service providers assume risk for failing to ensure 
that service levels are acceptable – but they assume such a risk as part of their overall cost-
benefit calculations. One argument for such an approach stems from empirical work 
showing that surveys and measurements are more effective when developed internally 
rather than externally.
48 Another argument notes that the local political process, rather 
than bureaucratic surveys, should provide for local-government accountabilit
49 y.  
 
Service provider (enterprise) level – the (mostly public) enterprises which provide 
municipal-regulated services should establish the requirements for their own service 
delivery surveys as part of their marketing department functions. Such a requirement may 
be embodied in their organic statute (articles of association) or instruction from the 
management board or general manager.
50 The larger firms will have experience with 
surveys and the company’s internal auditor can use these data to flag service delivery 
problems before the municipal authorities need to become involved.   
 
Municipal-level obligation – as previously noted, municipalities clearly have the legal 
authority to require service delivery surveys by public enterprises under their jurisdiction. 
Ordinance-based survey provisions may be required in order to ensure an “equal playing 
field” (namely that all service providers face the same costs). A municipal obligation may 
also provide uniformity across survey indicators – so different services may be compared.  
 
Legislative requirement – the Sobranie clearly has the legal right to legislate on municipal 
matters. The case for legislating on such a minor issue revolves around the constitutional 
issue of equality – namely ensuring fair access to public services for all citizens (as 
municipalities with service delivery surveys may provide better services to their citizens 
than others). Legislation can also ensure a certain quality of survey (such that the survey 
methodology follows accepted social science practice) and some survey items are 
comparable in order to allow for benchmarking (used to identify best-in-class and under-
performing managers).  
 
Source: authors.   
 
                                                 
48 Simon James, Kristina Murphy & Monika Reinhart, The Citizen’. Charter: How Such Initiatives Might Be 
More Effective, 20 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN 2, 1-18 (2005) [the authors show how citizens charters in the UK 
were effective only with voluntary surveys. When authorities (such as the tax police) initiated these 
initiatives, they met with much more success than if survey work was imposed by legal fiat. 
49 As in most countries, the collection of public service users’ opinions of public service delivery has 
remained unlegislated on the grounds that accountability for such service provision resulted from the local 
political process (namely mayors and municipal councils who failed to delivered adequate public services 
would be voted out of office).  
50 See Law on Public Enterprises, at article 11 (for incorporating documents) and article 16 (for management 
composition).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 19 
 
The Reasons for and Structure of Anti-Corruption Agencies for Municipal 
Authorities 
 
  The Macedonia central government – and particularly the State Commission for the 
Prevention of Corruption (the State Commission) – does not have the resources to 
effectively tackle the large volume of corrupt transactions in the country. Figure 12 shows 
the cases handled by the State Commission in 2007.
51 Supervising a total of roughly 
17,000 civil servants, the State Commission opened a little less than 600 cases in 2007 
(representing complaints against 3.5% of all civil servants) with a budget of €312,000 (or 
€283 for each of its 1,100 pending cases – representing less than one day’s wages for an 
average Western EU investigator).
52 Reflecting Macedonia’s passive system of anti-
corruption law enforcement (relying on complaints instead of pro-actively initiating audits 
or probes which may lead to the uncovering of wrong-doings), only 12 cases resulted from 
























Note: The data from the Original Table 1 were difficult to interpret. The items in hatches represent flow-
through from previous year. Source: State Commission (2007).
 
 
Of the cases handled by the State Commission, a large number consist of cases 
related to central or municipal authorities – and few are handled successfully. Figure 13 
shows complaints specifically about Macedonian national and municipal government 
officials (as opposed to overall complaints which include corruption in privatisation 
proceedings, health and educational establishments, public sector enterprises and other 
institutions). Of the roughly 350 complaints received, only 3 resulted in significant action 
by the State Commission (1 involved a criminal indictment, 1 resulted in a 
recommendation and 1 complaint led to a misdemeanor charge being filed against the 
accused). The State Commission’s Annual Report does not provide statistics specifically 
about municipalities, other than the number of letters sent to municipal bodies about 
complaints versus the number of responses the State Commission received. Of the 52 
letters send to municipalities (out of a total of 215 letters or roughly 25% of all letters), the 
State Commission received 28 out of 130 total responses or roughly 20% of responses 
coming from municipalities).  
 
                                                 
51 These graphs are taken from State Commission for Prevention of Corruption, Annual Report in 2007. 
(2008). Available online  at 53.  
52 Id., at 10.  
53 Id., at 11 [In 2007, the State Commission had a staff of 11 civil servants].  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 20 
 
                                                
 
 
  These limited data from the State Commission about follow-up on corruption 
allegations involving municipal government or service providers leads to two conclusions. 
First, the State Commission does not have the resources needed to effectively tackle 
municipal-level corruption. Second, the State Commission does not receive the level of 
co-operation from municipalities required in order to address municipal level corruption. 
The sanctions envisioned in the Anti-Corruption Law may provide part of the explanation 
for municipal-level lack of co-operation. Such sanctions are not likely to be “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive” as required by article 26(4) of the UN Convention Against 
Corruption. According to articles 61-66 of the Anti-Corruption Law, the fine for non-
criminal corruption offences ranges from €333 to €833. Clearly, the State Commission 
requires assistance from other state bodies if the Commission hopes to effectively tackle 
corruption.  
 
Municipal-level anti-corruption agencies are required in order to effectively tackle 
Macedonian municipal-level corruption. Professor Meagher defines an anti-corruption 
agency as a “separate, permanent [entity] whose primary function is to provide centralized 
leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity. The latter include policy analysis and 
technical assistance in prevention, public outreach and information, monitoring, 
investigation, and prosecution.”
54 While Professor Meagher intended the “centralised 
leadership” to refer to centralisation at the national (or federal) level, such centralisation 
can also refer to the municipal level. In various countries, such “agencies” consist of 
independent offices, but also may be commissions, committees, or even inter-departmental 
agencies – thus municipal-level agencies may take a possible number of organisational 
forms.    
 
 
54 Patrick Meagher, The Anti-corruption Agencies: Rhetoric versus Reality, 8 J. POL. REFORM 1, 69, 103 
(2005) at 70 [I have replaced the word “agencies” with “entity” to prevent the definition from being 
tautological].  
Figure 13: Corruption Complaints 






























Source: State Commission (2007)
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Macedonian municipal councils clearly have the mandate to establish such anti-
corruption agencies. Article 19 of the Local Government Law provides that municipal 
governments may be mandated (by central government agencies) with the responsibilities 
of central government if they are able to perform these responsibilities more effectively.
55 
Article 17 of the same law further establishes that municipal governments (and their 
dependencies) may:  
 
a) “adopt development programs which are of importance to the unit of local self-
government and citizens on issues under its jurisdiction (ss 1); 
 
b) “establish public services, public institutions and public enterprises for the 
performance of matters of local relevance...and exert control over their operations (ss 
29),  
 
c) establish inspection agencies and services in areas for which the units of local self- 
government have original jurisdiction in the regulation and performance of issues 
from those areas (ss 30) and  
 
d) determine offences and penalties when the ordinances of the unit of local self- 
government are violated (ss 31).
56 
 
The State Commission from its side should (in theory) have the authority to 
devolve part of its competencies to such municipal-level anti-corruption agencies. Chapter 
V of the Anti-Corruption Law does not explicitly grant or deny the State Commission the 
authority to delegate part of its functions to other government agencies. The only 
provision which the State Commission (and the state agency receiving the delegated 
mandate) may rely upon in cases where the State Commission agrees to the devolution of 
its responsibilities falls under article 49 of the Anti-Corruption Law (which delineates the 
jurisdiction of the State Commission). In the article, the State Commission may 
“cooperate[] with other state bodies in the suppression of corruption.” Clearly, the term 
“co-operate” may (or may not) provide the State Commission with the authority to 
devolve some of the other competencies granted to it (and required of it) in article 49.  
 
The devolution of State Commission’s competencies -- based on the meaning of 
the term “co-operate” -- hinges on two elements. The first element relies upon the State 
Commission and each municipality’s (or more likely the Association of Units of Local 
Self-Government or ZELS’s) ability to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding or 
Protocol – establishing a principal-agent relationship between the State Commission and 
the municipalities.
57 As the State Commission has already entered into a number of such 
 
55 Article 19 establishes that “The Republic may, by this and other laws, entrust to the units of local self-
government the responsibly to perform certain activities under jurisdiction of the organs of State 
administration 
for a more efficient and rational exercise of the rights and duties of its citizens and for the satisfaction of 
certain needs of direct interests of the citizens.” Sub-point (3) of the same article requires these central 
agencies to allocate funding for any mandates they may bestow upon municipal government.  
56 Article 29 empowers the municipal councils to oversee the implementation of each of these points in 
points 9, 10 and 11 respectively. Clearly, an anti-corruption agency would qualify under each of the four 
sub-points cited for Article 17 in defence of the municipality’s right to establish municipal-level anti-
corruption agencies.  
57 The ZELS does not have the authority to enter into agreements on behalf of its members and could only 
serve as honest broker, see supra note 88 for the ZELS’s competencies.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 22 
 
agreements, clearly the first element succeeds.
58 The second element relies upon a 
Macedonian administrative court vacating any appeals made of corruption related 
decisions (or the work of such municipal-level anti-corruption agencies) on the grounds 
that the municipal authority had acted ultra vires.
59 Figure 14 summarises these 
considerations in the form a legal test for the legality of municipal-level anti-corruption 
agencies in Macedonia whose competencies derive from the devolved responsibilities of 
the State Commission.   
  
Figure 14: Three Part Test for the Validity of the Establishment of Municipal Level 
Anti-Corruption Agencies in Macedonia 
 
1. Does Article 17 of the Local Government Law empower municipalities to singly or 
jointly establish an anti-corruption agency with delegated authority from the State 
Commission based on of their “importance to the unit of local self-government and 
citizens” 
 
2. Can the term “co-operate” in Article 49 of the Anti-Corruption Law be defined loosely 
enough to establish a principal-agent relationship between the State Commission and 
municipal authorities? 
 
3. Will an appeal of a municipal-level anti-corruption agency decision fail on the grounds 
that the agency did not act ultra vires? 
 
  The competencies of the municipal-level anti-corruption agencies rely (naturally) 
on the competencies available to the State Commission to devolve, as well as on the 
competencies which municipalities possess as part of their own authority to self-govern. 
Figure 15 provides an overview of each of these competencies – along with the ways 
which the State Commission could exercise a regulatory role over potential municipal 
level anti-corruption agencies (in order that these agencies assume the majority of the 
labour intensive work from State Commission officials).   
 
  Public education comprises an important anti-corruption policy issue for which the 
State Commission has not been able to fulfil its legislatively imposed obligations. Of the 
major anti-corruption public awareness campaigns in Macedonia, the main campaigns 
have been conducted by the Macedonian Customs Administration (though the posting of 
“no bribery” posters and the establishment of its toll-free 197 complaints hotline) as well 
as Transparency International – Macedonia’s poster campaigns and the offer of legal 
advice. Indeed, the State Commission relies on Transparency International – Macedonia to 
work with the public on legal counselling and has little interaction with the public. 
Municipal-level anti-corruption agencies would help the State Commission address that 
extremely important class of citizens, potential victims of bribery and actual (willing or 
unwilling) accomplices in bribery offences.
60  
                                                 
58 An example of such an agreement comprises the Christmas Day Protocol between the State Commission 
and the Public Revenue Office, Public Prosecution Office, Public Procurator Office, Judicial Council, 
Ministry of Interior, State Audit Office, Customs Administration, Directorate for Financial Police, 
Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the State Authority for Geodetic Works in 2007.  
59 Clearly, any decision finding that the municipal anti-corruption agency acted beyond the scope of its 
powers would be tantamount to striking down the validity of any scheme of “co-operation” between the 
State Commission and municipal anti-corruption agencies.  
60 For authors such as Professor Carr, such an educational function would represent the most important part 
of the State Commission’s work. Professor Carr represents one of the strongest critics of legal action against QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 23 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
corruption, and argues strongly and cogently for public education. See Indira Carr, Corruption, Legal 




Figure 15: Competencies of Municipal-Level Anti-Corruption Agencies 
 
Competencies under Anti-Corruption Law 




gives opinions about laws   - provide guidance to municipality-
level anti-corruption agencies about 
ruling on ordinances  
- receives municipalities’ legal 
opinions on ordinances 
- provides rulings on ordinances if 
impact on corruption 
- refers contentious cases to State 
Commission  
proposals for supervising 
political parties 
- provide guidance and if necessary 
pass views to Electoral Commission 
- supervise local elections and 
receive complaints 
proposals for supervising 
NGOs 
- regular oversight and learning from 
municipal ant-corruption agency “best 
practice” 
- act as first screener for proposals 
related to regulating NGOs for 
corruption 
considers conflict of interest 
cases 
- provides guidelines for auditing 
interest declarations 
 
follows changes in wealth of 
local officials  
- provides instructions on conducting 
random audits 
- allows for “community policing” 
- conducts random audits (driving 
past officials house to see if 
corresponds to declared interest, 
etc). 
co-operates with other state 
agencies 
- serves as voice for municipal level 
anti-corruption agencies vis-a-vis state 
agencies  
- negotiates ability to receive 
complaints about state administration 
(health and education in particular) 
- focuses on high risk sectors of 
health and education (if allowed) 
- receives local complaints about 
teachers, doctors and other local 
level service providers 
provides education  - learning from municipal ant-
corruption agency “best practice” 
- works with local NGOs and law 
enforcement officials on behalf of 
State Commission 
Competencies under Local Government Law 
Article 29(10)  Probably negotiated through ZELS*  - handling of non-criminal 
disciplinary proceedings 
Article 29(9)  Probably negotiated through ZELS  - corruption risk audit 
- risk profiles of staff 
Source: authors.  
* ZELS refers to the Association of the Units of Local Self-Government (see next section for more).  
 
As Macedonia clearly should not have 84 municipal-level anti-corruption agencies, 
only a limited number of municipal-level agencies should be established. The Local 
Government Law provides that “the units of local self-government shall cooperate among 
themselves” and may “in order to achieve their common interests and to perform common 
tasks with the framework of their jurisdiction in a broader territory, the units of local self-
government may join funds and establish common services, organizations, public 
enterprises and public services.”
61 As such, the Law clearly provides the basis for 
municipal-level anti-corruption agencies with inter-municipality jurisdiction (namely 
established as the co-operative effort of several municipalities).   
 
  The “optimal location” of these agencies should balance the costs and benefits of 
agglomerating municipalities. The social and budgetary costs of establishing these 
agencies depend on the cost of staffing, providing offices, training, and the time and effort 
of individuals who make corruption-related complaints. The benefits of such municipal-
level anti-corruption agencies stem from the increased number of complaints which the 
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State Commission could indirectly process, the increased tax and customs revenue 
deriving from successfully prosecuted complaints and investigations – and ultimately 
increased revenue to Macedonian and foreign business (who are spared the transactions 
costs involved with bribery). Figure 16 shows the results of a “gravity” model which has 
been used in some of the applied economic work to decide on the optimal location of a 





  The largest benefit of such municipal-level anti-corruption agencies (with the 
delegated authority from the State Commission) derives from their ability to watch over 
municipal government interests. These agencies also benefit from flexible and responsive 
law-making (by municipal councils) which becomes difficult at the national (legislative) 
level.
63 In particular, the relevant Macedonian legislation which could empower law 
enforcement agencies to offer rewards to witnesses or other third-parties for helping to 
solve crimes (such as corruption) remains conspicuously absent. However, the payment of 
such rewards (or qui tam rewards as will be discussed in the next section) can be done by 
these municipal-level anti-corruption agencies without requiring national legislation – 
particularly as a discretionary reward rather than automatic entitlement.  
Implementing Qui Tam at the Municipal Level 
 
Qui tam actions (or law suits) allows individuals who denounce corruption (or any 
other offence against the financial interests of the state) to obtain a share of the damages 
                                                 
62 See Bryane Michael, Explaining Organizational Change in International Development: The Role of 
Complexity in Anti-Corruption Work, 16 J. INTL DEV. 8, 1067 – 1088 [which provides in more detail the 
gravity model referred to in the text].  
63 The other “location” issue consists of the organisational form by which the municipal-level anti-corruption 
agency chooses. Some possible options include -- as a special office established by the municipal council, as 
an extra office to an already established office, or even as a delegated NGO service provider. We do not 
discuss these issues in-depth as the optimal organisational form would probably be chosen in debate by the 
relevant municipal council(s).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 26 
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recovered by the state.
64 Due to its negative effects on social solidarity, support for qui 
tam legislation in Europe has been severely wanting. As written evidence to the U
Parliament, Tony Burchell notes that “communication from JSB Eurojust, the Vice 
President of the European Commission and MEPs indicated my proposal lacked the 
necessary quality to entice other interested parties to support strengthened whistleblowing 
provisions [specific qui tam].”
65 National legislation establishing qui tam rewards in 
Macedonia will probably also be impractical in the near future – as no precedent for giving 
such rewards have been established in the criminal or administrative code for offering 
rewards to witnesses or informers. However, local-level (municipal) programmes may 
usefully serve as pilot projects for national laws. In this respect, municipal governments 
may be empowered to establish “qui tam-like” rewards as a test for future legislation.
66 
 
A number of reasons support the attempt to establish qui tam rewards at the 
municipal level in Macedonia. The close tie with between the increase in local revenue 
and qui tam rewards (offered by municipal council decree for example) makes the 
implementation of qui tam provisions in municipal ordinances more transparent than a 
similar programme adopted through legislative means (which targets national-level public 
services). Imagine a woman in Veles (with its population of 55,000 people and 23 member 
municipal council) denounces an electricity-skimming fraud. Such a denouncement saves 
her municipality €50,000. The local council can vote on the appropriate 20% refund (for 
example) to the woman. The Veles municipality gains an extra €40,000 and the lady – 
called a “relator” in US terminology -- receives a check from the municipality for 
€10,000. As an open council decision, the payment receives press scrutiny (thereby 
decreasing the chances of payments made on the grounds of patronage or corruption 
within the municipal council).
67 In contrast, a man who denounces a VAT fraud scheme to 
the Customs Administration deals in a fraud which may occur many kilometres away (or 
even in a foreign country) and over a long range of time. Such a national scheme would be 
much harder to implement.  
 
The increased oversight and increase reversibility of ordinance-based qui tam 
rewards provide another benefit over a legislative based qui tam programme. If false 
accusations or other problems arise from the qui tam programme at the national level, 
legislation would be difficult and costly to revoke (requiring a vote of the Sobranie). At 
the municipal level, though, the ordinance can be easily rescinded or modified at a 
monthly council meeting. Municipal ordinances receive the oversight of the Constitutional 
Court and may be the subject of citizen lawsuits. Moreover, an article in the ordinance can 
be drafted requiring the municipal council or mayor’s office to review the ordinance or to 
automatically place the ordinance under review if a certain number of people make 
complaints about municipal qui tam procedures. The ordinance can also have a 
termination clause (such that the ordinance will pass out of effect if the revenue collected 
 
64 Qui tam laws have a long and controversial history as qui tam rewards create incentives for untrained 
private citizens to engage in law enforcement activities as well as increase the number of relatively 
unsubstantiated accusations. For a history of qui tam legislation (and the social costs and benefits of 
implementing qui tam provisions), see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources V.United States Ex Rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), available online.   
65 Memorandum by Tony Burchell to the Select Committee on European Union on the 3rd March 2008. 
Available online.  
66 See A Riley, Civil False Claims Act: Using Lincoln's Law to Protect the European Community Budget, 
NOTTINGHAM L. J. (2004).  For a financial analysis of the effectiveness of qui tam provisions, see C. 
Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, COLOMBIA L. REV. (2007).   
67 In cases where the witness or informant seeks public anonymity, the council may take its qui tam reward 
decision at a closed doors session.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 27 
 
from the ordinance does not exceed costs of enforcement -- or if enough citizens object to 
the ordinance).
68   
 
The current legislative framework makes the payment of qui tam awards at the 
municipal-level relatively unclear. The Local Government Law also remains silent about 
the payment of discretionary awards or other payments which may serve as qui tam 
rewards.
69  The lack of a restriction against municipally appropriated qui tam awards 
provides an opportunity to Macedonian municipal councillors to adopt ordinance-based 
qui tam provisions. Figure 17 provides a test for the legality of municipal-level qui tam 
rewards in Macedonia.  
 
Figure 17: A Test for the Legality of Municipal-level Qui Tam Rewards 
 
1. Are qui tam rewards to citizens unconstitutional (and thus likely to be overturned by the 
Constitutional Court)?  
 
2. Does the municipality have the right to dedicate an appropriation for qui tam rewards 
during budgetary negotiations under the Budget Law?  
 
3. Does the municipality have the right to disburse Council apportioned discretionary 
payments to individuals under the Budget Law? 
 
4. Does the case involve a: 
i. harm to the municipality’s interests (which can be determined in financial terms  
and a situation in which the municipality can successfully recover damages,  
prevent an expenditure, or the loss of revenue) and, 
 
ii. municipal service (building zone regulation, garbage collection, top up  
payments to primary schools, etc.).  
 
The Constitutional Court may over-turn any qui tam ordinance provisions. 
However, three constitutional articles may come to the defence of the advocate of 
ordinance-based qui tam provisions.
70 Qui tam (if correctly designed and implemented) 
upholds the constitutional values of “legal protection of property,” “social justice” and of 
course deference to “local self-governance.”
71 If “property” (under article 8) includes 
public or state property, then qui tam provisions automatically uphold the cited 
constitutional value. The Constitutional Court may also interpret qui tam awards as a 
                                                 
68 A qui tam scheme administrated by a municipal-level anti-corruption agency would also help address the 
issue of frivolous denouncements and complaints. Presumably, the municipal-level anti-corruption agency 
would be able to record individuals who make repeated claims, claims without evidence or make claims 
seeking revenge for some personal or professional harm. As an aside, according to theory, a penalty for 
frivolous complaints can be imposed which will deter such complaints. Michael (2006) treats the issue of 
“mechanism design” related to qui tam rewards and discusses the use of negative payments (in a game 
theoretic context) in order to ensure the socially optimal level of qui tam actions. See Bryane Michael, 
Drafting Implementing Regulations for International Anti-Corruption Conventions, QEH WORKING PAPER 
NO.150 (2007), available online.  
69 In countries such as Ukraine, the creation of qui tam rewards at the municipal level present fewer legal 
difficulties, as Ukrainian oblasts have the right to pay discretionary “awards” upon the approval of the 
Oblast Council and suggest individuals for state awards. Even in Ukraine, though, such awards would 
require a bit of creative legal analysis.  
70  For an overview of the constitutional issues involved in qui tam lawmaking (in a US context), see Evan 
Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE. L. J. 2 (1989). 
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protection of private property to the extent that corruption makes property rights over state 
entitlements more insecure and even comprises the theft of an individual’s “property” in 
the form of tax payments.
72 Second, Professor Kumar cogently argues that corruption 
represents a threat to human rights, social justice and even national sovereignty.
73 Thus, in 
order for the Constitutional Court to rule qui tam rewards as unconstitutional, the Court 
would need to show that such rewards would have no impact on corruption -- as qui tam 
rewards (in themselves) have no (positive or negative) effect on individual liberties. Third, 
qui tam serves to guarantee the “the right of citizens to local self-government” (as 
stipulated by article 114) and thus comprises a local-governance issue instead of a law 
enforcement issue. The payment of qui tam awards clearly does not affect any part of the 
investigation or prosecution of any offence (which fall into the jurisdiction of the 
appropriate law enforcement agency). In this matter, the constitutional court does not need 
to find such payments constitutional. The Constitutional Court only needs to find that they 
are not unconstitutional. As such, the constitutional court need not find qui tam payments 
constitution – only that the Court must refrain from finding them unconstitutional.  
 
As for getting the money to the relators, the Macedonian Budget Law (in theory) 
allows for the appropriation of funds for qui tam rewards. As a “budget user” (as defined 
in article 2.1 of the Budget Law), a municipality may propose in its budget request any 
foreseen or contingent expenditure (or liability), subject to Ministry of Finance and later 
Parliamentary approval. As qui tam provisions are always self-financed, the fiscal 
implications will always be positive.
74 Such appropriations would consist naturally of a 
part of any administrative fines collected under the Anti-Corruption Law and a part of the 
recovery of damages in criminal and civil proceedings which are paid into the central 
Treasury account. Municipalities (as legal persons) may also sue their own staff and the 
perpetrators of corruption for damages – and these funds would be entered into the 
municipality’s entry in the Treasury Ledger. Once the funds are appropriated, the mayor 
has the discretion to release these funds.
75  
 
Even though qui tam rewards may be legal, a number of issues need to be resolved 
at the ordinance-level. First, the ordinance should define the conditions under which a 
complaint, which leads to a qui tam action, may be rewarded. Obvious issues related to 
these conditions involve the legality of paying civil servants (as relators) who engage in 
whistle-blowing, the payment of joint or several qui tam rewards, maximum payments and 
the handling of relator confidentiality. Second, the ordinance should define municipal-
level anti-corruption agencies procedures for handling of qui tam complaints (arising from 
the delegated authority to collect complaints on behalf of the municipality in case where 
State Commission jurisdiction is not involved, methods by which complaints are handled, 
appeal of qui tam awards in cases where the relator disagrees with his or her award and 
other issues). Third, ordinance-based provisions should be in place for the review of the 
handling of qui tam cases (by both the municipal-level anti-corruption agency and by 
municipal councils which both regulate the agencies’ work and make qui tam awards).  
Municipal ordinances can resolve these and other issues.  
 
72 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, ARTICLE 33 [“everyone...is obliged to pay tax and other 
public contributions, as well as to share in the discharge of public expenditure in a manner determined by 
law.”] 
73 See C Kumar, Corruption, Human Rights, and Devlopment: Sovereignty and State Capacity to Promote 
Good Governance, 99 AM. SOC’Y  INT’L L. PROC. 416 (2005). 
74 Article 26 of the Budget Law imposes on budget users the requirement to provide an assessment of the 
fiscal impact of any budget request.   
75 Part 4 of the test referred to in Figure 17 follows relatively automatically from the prosecution for 
corruption. Namely, if the offence concerned a municipal service, then part 4 of the test is automatically 
satisfied.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 29 
 
                                                
Toward a Model Anti-Corruption Ordinance  
 
  Numerous complexities arise during the drafting of an anti-corruption ordinance. 
The supremacy of legislation, and a wide variety of other laws, complicates significantly 
ordinance drafting (as does the numerous potential conflict of laws which may arise within 
the municipality, between municipalities and with executive agency regulations). Unlike 
in the United States (where 10
th Amendment rights devolve power to the people) or with 
the EU Treaty doctrine of subsidiarity, in Macedonia such sovereignty remains expressed 
through national institutions. Municipalities “get the scraps and left overs” of state 
authority.
76 Nevertheless, a number of provisions may be drafted into a municipal-level 
anti-corruption ordinance (and Figure 18 provides a draft “model” ordinance).
77   
 
An anti-corruption ordinance needs to define the legislatively mandated, as well as 
devolved authority, of the municipality for fighting corruption (which will be useful later 
in the ordinance). Devolved authorities may include (depending on the State 
Commission’s interpretation): giving opinions about laws, proposals for supervising 
political parties, proposals for supervising NGOs, consideration of conflict of interest 
cases, supervision of changes in wealth of local officials, co-operation with other state 
agencies, and providing education about preventing and fighting corruption. The own-
competencies of such anti-corruption agencies (given by the subscriber municipalities 
themselves) include the handling of non-criminal disciplinary proceedings, the conduct of 
corruption risk audits and creation of risk profiles of staff (including integrity probes) as 
well as conduct of service delivery surveys. Competencies (which remain to be defined) 
include the grant of positive administrative silence, the setting up of a qui tam reward 
scheme, the putting in place of additional safeguards related to public procurement, and 
the grant of certiorari relief from local service delivery related ordinances. 
 
  With the municipality’s legal competencies established, the anti-corruption 
ordinance can assign those competencies to the entity best able to execute them. As 
previously discussed, a (inter-municipal) anti-corruption agency may serve as an 
organisational entity best able to provide efficiency and economy. As multiple 
municipalities are involved, the ordinance would define the procedures for co-ordinating 
and negotiating with other municipalities and the grant of jurisdiction over municipal-level 
public services operating in the municipality. The composition of the agency would be 
described, the method of employment or secondment defined, and the physical office 
would be agreed upon.  
 
Relations between the municipal-level anti-corruption agency and the municipal 
authorities (with mayors and particularly the councils of the subscriber municipalities) 
would also need to be defined. As the municipal-level anti-corruption agency has no 
authority of its own, the ordinance must define the anti-corruption agency’s relations with 
each of its member municipalities. The ordinance would also define the procedure to 
follow for putting anti-corruption agency items on the council’s meeting agenda – as well 
as procedures for raising issues or requests to the shared municipal anti-corruption agency 
 
76 As in interesting side issue, Macedonia has ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government 
(CETS 122) which states in article 4/3 that “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in 
preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another 
authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy.” 
The legal issues involved in an international treaty which helps guarantee the supremacy of local legal 
autonomy shall certain provoke debate in Macedonia for years to come.  
77 We discuss the main or more controversial issues in the “model” ordinance and omit a discussion of 
several of the chapters to save space.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 30 
 
during council meetings. The agency’s authority to act in municipalities other than the one 
which houses (or hosts) the physical offices of the agency would also be established.  
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Chapter 1 Definitions 
Chapter 2: Competencies of the Municipality to Fight Corruption in Public Services 
Chapter 3: Establishment, Mandate, Composition and Premises of Agency 
Chapter 4: Agency-Council Relations 
Chapter 5: Funding of Regional Anti-Corruption Agency 
 
OPERATIONAL PROVISIONS: DELEGATED COMPETENCIES 
 
Chapter 6: Provisions for Legal Review (Legislation, Regulations and Ordinances) 
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Chapter 10: Representations to State Agencies 
Chapter 11: Responsibilities for Public Education and Awareness Raising 
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                    Public Services 
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       Corruption Risk Audit (including integrity probes) 
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The funding of such municipal-level anti-corruption agencies represents one of the 
most important and difficult questions related to ordinance-based anti-corruption work. As 
mentioned previously, a budgetary appropriation would need to be made for qui tam 
provisions. However, the municipality would also need to apportion a pro-rata share for its 
subscription for “core” funding for the agency. While the easiest funding scheme would be 
based on the municipality’s population or share of national GDP, such a funding 
arrangement would severely dampen any performance incentives. Funding should be QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 32 
 
                                                
based on either the level of corruption in the municipality or the success of local 
corruption fighters in reducing corruption.
78  
 
Legal review represents one of the most important non-operational competencies 
which can be devolved from the State Commission. Such review consists of reviewing 
legislation and executive agency regulations on behalf of the State Commission (as 
required given their limited manpower). Such review more usefully may consist of council 
decisions and ordinances as well as internal instructions of the managing committees of 
the public enterprises which provide municipal-level public services. Naturally, the 
municipal-level anti-corruption agency would need to use risk-profiling and sample 
municipal-level instructions and ordinances to review. Furthermore, the anti-corruption 
agency can recommend that municipal councils give certiorari relief from local service 
delivery related-ordinances in cases where the regulation poses a high corruption risk.  
 
Assistance with the supervision of local elections represents another area of 
delegated responsibility which municipal-level anti-corruption agencies could assume. In 
Macedonia, counsellors from each of the 84 municipalities may be elected from roughly 
60 political parties. The State Commission will have tremendous difficulty monitoring the 
24 provisions of the Anti-Corruption Law (related to political party corruption) of these 
potentially thousands of candidates to municipal elections.
79 Article 45 of the Law on 
Local Elections notes that, “the financial report [of the campaign] shall be submitted to the 
municipal council and the Council of the City of Skopje no later than 3 months after the 
elections are finished.”
80 As a result, the Council of the City of Skopje can easily receive 
over 1,000 campaign reports (if reported for each candidate)! Even over one of those 
reports, surveillance would be difficult – given the complexity of the revenue and expense 
figures provided. For example, article 8 notes that “a political party, trade union, or 
association of citizens may not collect funds in cash from unidentified sources for 
financing its activity.” Yet, for the simplest accounts, an auditor may need hundreds of 
hours to collect enough evidence to show that an expense had been paid in cash (and from 
a source the accounts do not identify).  
 
Municipal-ordinance drafting may also usefully define the responsibilities of the 
municipal-level anti-corruption agency in monitoring conflicts of interests. Such 
monitoring may include supervision over potential conflicts of interest among municipal 
employees and the employees of the 70 public enterprises which operate in the 
municipalities. Municipal-level anti-corruption agency work may also include helping the 
State Commission to collect conflict of interest declarations from these employees, 
holding declarations, and helping with the conduct of random audits of declared interests 
(as well as the random audit of municipal employees for undeclared interests).  
 
Such ordinances may also clarify the procedures to follow for delegated work on 
asset declarations. Municipal-level anti-corruption agencies may help the State 
Commission collect the large number of asset declarations (of the over 17,000 public 
 
78 For the economic analysis of the optimal funding of such anti-corruption agencies, see Michael, supra 
note 68. A system of internal budgets can also be used such that each municipalities could draw on the 
agency for services at an internal price. However, such a system would be inferior to the “performance-
based budgeting” scheme previously proposed.   
79 Chapter II of the Anti-Corruption Law deals exclusively with the prevention of political corruption while 
Chapter III deals with the prevention of corruption in “public mandates” (addressing political figures as both 
candidates and as public officials after election).  
80 Law on Local Elections, available online.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 33 
 
                                                
officials working within the “colour of the law” of Macedonian municipal government).
81 
The ordinance may also define procedures for the collection of such asset declarations and 
the local-level processing of any information before being transmitted to the State 
Commission. The local anti-corruption agencies could also usefully provide counselling 
on filling in asset declarations and monitoring any significant changes to municipal public 
officials’ wealth. Article 34 of the Conflict of Interest Law imposes a relatively heavy 
regulatory burden on the State Commission. The article covers any “elected or appointed 
civil servant, official and responsible person in a public enterprise or other juridical person 
managing state capital...[and] property of a member of his family.”
82 Members of his or 
her family may be interpreted in the law as a “person in close affiliation” -- and thus 
persons in wedlock or a non-marital relationship with the official, his/her lineal blood 
relatives and lateral relative by sanguinity up to the fourth degree, adoptive parent or 
adoptee, in-laws conclusive with the second degree of relation.”
83 Significant changes, 
according to the law, are “worth more than the amount of twenty average salaries in the 
economy in the previous three-month period.”
84  
 
Related to the municipalities own competencies, the handling of non-criminal 
disciplinary proceedings represents an important area of municipal-level anti-corruption 
agency work. In many cases, the police do not investigate cases of alleged or suspected 
corruption. Instead of criminal investigation, for minor corruption offences, the municipal 
agency (or public enterprise involved) may initiate its own disciplinary procedures. A 
municipal-level anti-corruption ordinance may treat the procedures to follow, both in the 




Corruption-risk profiles and risk audits comprise another area of work for 
municipal-level anti-corruption agencies. Risk profiling consists of assessing the 
probability of a municipal official taking part in corrupt activities. Increasingly, agencies 
are assigning risk probability to individuals or the offices they occupy. In some cases, 
these profiles are used to guide risk audits – either performance or compliance audits.
86 
Municipal governments have the duty to establish risk profiles and conduct regular 
corruption risk audits in order to indemnify themselves (as legal persons) for joint liability 
if their staff are found guilty of corruption, to protect their own financial interests and to 
 
81 The estimate of the number of municipal-level civil servants represents best-guess based on World Bank 
and local government statistics.  
82 Conflict of Interest Law, at article 34. 
83 Id., art. 3. Without exaggerating, given a population of 2 million people, article 3 requires that the 
government receive information about the assets of roughly 15% of the entire Macedonian population! The 
World Bank reports a civil servant base of roughly 20,000 people. Assuming each of those individuals 
participates in one monogamous relationship and that both individuals in the relationship have 2 surviving 
parents, 2 siblings and those siblings have either 2 parents or children of asset-holding age, the government 
should keep information about the assets of roughly 320,000 individuals.  
84 Id., at 34. At the time of this writing, such a change is wealth equals roughly €5,000 (a month’s rent in a 
large European capitol).  
85 Around the world, criminal investigators are increasingly relying on regulatory investigations (and relying 
on the legal person’s own internal investigation) to provide prosecutors with initial evidence about whether 
to take the case forward. See M Shabat, SEC Regulation of Attorneys under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Decisions on Efficiency and their Role in International Anti-Bribery Efforts, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
987 (1999) [also provides a particularly interesting discussion about the role of attorney-client privilege 
during internal investigations in a US context].  
86 For more on the corruption risk audit, see MUHAMMAD KHAN, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO CORRUPTION 
AUDITING: THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS AND GOVERNMENT AUDITORS (2005).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 34 
 




  Severability will represent an important issue in the new legal area of anti-
corruption ordinance drafting. The Macedonian Constitutional Court may disagree with 
the legal analysis provided in this article and strike down one or more of the provisions in 
the ordinance. The severability clause should keep the rest of the ordinance intact as well 
as preferably define procedures to follow if any particular provision (such as the qui tam 
reward scheme or the grant of positive administrative silence rights) are deemed 
unconstitutional or ultra vires to the municipal council.   
 
As previously mentioned, the independent adoption of 84 different ordinances 
would be impractical. In practice, a likely diffusion mechanism for anti-corruption 
ordinance-making in Macedonia would be the ZELS or the Association of the Units of 
Local Self-Government of the Republic of Macedonia. Discussion (and possible 
promotion) of such a model clearly falls in the ZELS’s charter of “maint[aining], 
develop[ing], and strengthening...efficient and effective local self-government” (article 
6.1.2).
88 The ZELS would likely promulgate the anti-corruption model ordinance by 
“organizing conferences, seminars, consultations, workshops, sessions, fairs, campaigns, 
etc.” (as required by article 7.1.1 of its charter).  
 
As part of its legally required mandate, the ordinance should have a regulatory 
impact assessment.
89 According to economic estimates, corruption involving municipal 
services in Macedonia is likely to involve €2 million.
90 The ordinance should improve the 
State Commission’s audit capabilities and improve service provision (by incentives 
offered through qui tam rewards and scorecard results). If such activities reduce corruption 
by 10%, then municipalities will save €200,000 over the next 2 years. In contrast, the costs 
of the adoption of the model ordinance (and the establishment of the three municipal-level 
anti-corruption agencies) would involve €37,100.
91 As a result, Macedonian welfare 
would increase by €162,900.   
 
Figure 19: Regulatory Impact Assessment Costs of Anti-Corruption Municipal 
Ordinance 
 







Establishment of 3 municipal level 
anti-corruption agencies  
30  9 (max)  270   € 5,400 
assistance with 300 scorecards  60  3  180  € 3,600 
review of 500 ordinances or 
instructions 
60 3  180  € 3,600 
assistance with asset declarations  40  2  80  € 1,600 
                                                 
87 For a review of some of the law in this area, see R. Evans, Damages for Unlawful Administrative Action: 
the Remedy for Misfeasance in Public Office, 4 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 31 (1982) 
88 Bylaws of the Association of the Units of Local Self-Government, available online. 
89 The legislative requirement for Regulatory Impact Analysis (or RIA) for Macedonia is discussed in 
OECD, Review of Regulatory Governance in South East Europe, Available online.  
90 The calculation of the probable economic value of corruption in a country requires a range of assumptions 
and estimates (which we do not discuss for reasons of space). For a country with a GDP of $8 billion and a 
ranking of 84 out of 179 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, an 
estimate of .0025% of GDP involved in bribes does not seem like an excessively high estimate of the value 
of bribery in Macedonia. For more on the economic calculation of corruption, see SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
supra note 14 or Bryane Michael and Mariya Polner, supra note 9.  
91 The relative low cost stems from Macedonia’s low public sector wage structure.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS168  Page 35 
 
admin of qui tam scheme  60  2  120  € 2,400 
advising government officials  30  9  270  € 5,400 
counselling municipal service users  60  9  540  €10,800 
anti-corruption publicity  40  2  80  € 1,600 
ZELS’s work  45  3  135  €2,700 
other agency’s work in adjusting to 
model ordinance 
2 200  400   
Totals 387  240  2175  € 37,100 
* The calculations in the Figure assumes €20 euros a day salary on average resulting in the relatively low 
cost of the anti-corruption ordinance-making programme by international standards.   
 
Conclusions and Future Research Questions 
 
The Macedonian fight against corruption could usefully benefit from ordinance 
design which leads to the establishment of municipal-level anti-corruption agencies. Such 
anti-corruption agencies -- representing possibly the first example of such agencies 
covering an entire nation-state -- could increase welfare in the first year of their operation 
by €162,900 by significantly contributing to the work of the State Commission for the 
Prevention of Corruption.  
 
The most important future research question revolves around the authority of 
municipalities to engage in anti-corruption law-making -- given the tension between 
decentralisation (which favours municipal-level anti-corruption work) and adoption of the 
international anti-corruption conventions (which tend toward nationally-centralised 
agencies and the strengthening of the central services such as the Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Justice and other state ministries). Given the declining interest in municipal 
anti-corruption programmes (and increasing interest in international anti-corruption 
conventions), this paper hopes to put municipal government back into the research arena.  
 
The secondary future research question revolves, naturally, around the 
effectiveness of such municipal anti-corruption programmes. Despite over 8 years of work 
on municipal anti-corruption programmes (mostly inspired by Klitgaard et al.’s work), 
academics and practitioners have relatively few success stories based on these authors’ 
example. If the Macedonia government launches an ordinance-based anti-corruption 
programme, the results may provide data for future research to determine whether donor 
agencies – like the World Bank and USAID in particular – should continue their anti-
corruption work with municipalities. .  
 
  
 